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“The allergy to aura, from which 
no art today is able to escape, is in-
separable from the eruption of inhu-
manity.”– Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic 
Theory 1
The concept of the posthuman is not 
really new; the more you think about it the 
older it gets. Fundamentally it has to do 
with a non-unilateral conception of the 
human’s relationship to the world which 
imagines the species as embedded in 
an expanded web of physical, biological, 
semiotic and material relations of ex-
change. Implied within this is a process 
of continuous individual and species 
transformation or becoming based on the 
passing back and forth of causality, com-
munication and events. All it really means 
is that there is no human without a world 
of which it is continuously, emergently 
and constitutively a part, although there 
certainly was and can be a world with-
out humans. While this conception of our 
species’ reciprocal relationship to the 
world can be found within even the ear-
liest human cultures and religions, today 
the term has developed a sharp political 
edge that previously it either did not pos-
sess (for instance within animist world 
views) or did not own (there is doubtless 
a politics of animism). However, in these 
earlier times the human was not negated 
or disparaged by such ‘webbed’ ontolog-
ical conceptions, while today there is a 
strong streak of antihumanism running 
through nearly all notions of the posthu-
man. The human, most especially in its 
Enlightenment conception as a species 
separated from the rest of nature by vir-
tue of its superior capacity for symbolic 
signification, culture and technological 
artifice, is today a form to be abandoned 
as irrevocably implicated in capitalist co-
lonialism, its racist othering of non-Euro-
peans and its violent expropriation of the 
natural world that is threatening a near 
destruction of our biosphere. This desire 
for exodus from European ‘monohuman-
ism’2 comes at the intersection point of a 
scientific discrediting of Cartesian objec-
tivity and its techno-positivist worldview,3 
expanded anthropological conceptions 
of culture and semiosis as non-exclusive 
to humans, the context-sensitivity of de-
constructionism and identity politics, and 
the now tangible unfolding of a long an-
ticipated climate crisis. As Rosi Braidotti 
puts it, human is a term that ensures a 
‘privileged access to resources’, and it 
is this privilege that is in question today.4 
However, the self-critiquing – or 
one might say self-hating or antihuman-
ist – aspect of posthumanism is only 
one, albeit powerful, tendency of the 
discourse; one which, it should be said, 
problematically fails to consider the hu-
man in this capitalist, globally extended 
European supremacist sense as victim 
to, as much as perpetrator of, a social 
mode of production and relation that has 
systematically annihilated almost all oth-
er forms of being human on Earth today. 
There are more promising dimensions of 
posthumanist theory, however, that do 
not necessarily blame the human for its 
species self-interest so much as under-
mine its basis for justifying its difference 
and superiority to other life. Such a line 
of argument is convincingly proposed by 
anthropologist Eduardo Kohn in his eth-
nography of the Runa of Ecuador’s Up-
per Amazon, How Forests Think: Toward 
an Anthropology Beyond the Human. 
Through an extended discussion of the 
semiotic assemblages that exist between 
the Runa and the rich diversity of animal 
and plant life that cluster in the Amazon, 
Kohn asserts that “all life is semiotic and 
all semiosis is alive”.5 By this he means 
that signification and hence communica-
tion, selfhood, and even thought can be 
said to exist within all living beings and 
systems, as summarised in his proposi-
tion that “life and thought are one and 
the same: life thinks; thoughts are alive.”6 
Kohn extends this proposition to exam-
ine how the non-human production of 
signification challenges the notion that 
the human world is in some sense on-
tologically self-sufficient and therefore 
closed. “By contrast,” he writes, “The 
Open Whole aims to show that the rec-
ognition of representational processes 
as something unique to, and in a sense 
even synonymous with life, allows us to 
situate distinctively human ways of being 
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in the world as both emergent from and 
in continuity with a broader living semi-
otic realm.”7 Outside of language we are 
communicating through non-symbolic 
sign systems all the time with multiple 
beings, matter, phenomena and there-
fore, importantly, futures. Accordingly, 
‘thought’ and meaning-making can be 
radically extended to all of life, posi-
tioning the human in a world thick with 
semiotic production and interpretation. 
Conversely, semiosis is represented as 
profoundly material: “Although semiosis 
is something more than energetics and 
materiality, all sign processes eventually 
‘do things’ in the world, and this is an im-
portant part of what makes them alive.”8 
In order to think through the implications 
of posthuman theory for art, I am inter-
ested in this proposition in particular for 
the way that it impacts art’s minimum 
condition – the production of something 
whole, a semantic unity, out of what was 
previously inexistent or amorphous, pro-
ducing what Theodor Adorno describes 
as art’s ineluctable semblance character. 
For Adorno, the artwork’s illusory factic-
ity issues from, yet also differs from, an 
external reality understood as indetermi-
nate in its relation to the artwork.
For this high modernist aesthetic 
philosopher, modern art’s key paradox 
arises through its rejection of aura based 
in the illusion or semblance of its own 
facticity (whose zenith was reached in 
the nineteenth century quest for veri-
similitude in artwork, a semblance that 
denies its own semblance). Out of this 
rejection art begins to literalise the ma-
terial processes of its own making which 
“release the production in the product” 
or expose its status as having been 
made.9 Yet simultaneously, by wishing to 
expel the semblance of its own autono-
mous difference to external reality, the 
artwork aims to “bring into appearance 
what is not the result of making”.10 How-
ever, the attempt by modern – and, we 
may add, contemporary – art to overstep 
the artwork’s problematic illusoriness11 
by staging what Adorno calls ‘empirical 
reality’ directly within the artwork snags 
it in a ‘second naturalism’ which, by es-
chewing semblance, reimposes it at a 
higher level: “The difference of artworks 
from the empirical world,” writes Adorno, 
“their semblance character, is constitut-
ed out of the empirical world and in op-
position to it. If for the sake of their own 
concept artworks wanted absolutely to 
destroy their reference back to the em-
pirical world, they would wipe out their 
own premise.”12 Contemporary art can 
neither aspire to the ‘phantasmagoric’ 
semblance character of realism nor to 
producing something wholly indepen-
dent of the external reality from which all 
its “form and materials, spirit and subject 
matter” are derived; nor too can it aspire 
to being simply continuous with external 
reality while holding onto the difference 
that makes it art at all. Adorno illustrates 
this dilemma rather charmingly with the 
image of the artwork trying to shake off 
its illusoriness “like an animal trying to 
shake off its antlers”.13 Artists of the last 
century increasingly included ‘external 
reality’ directly within the artwork in 
such a way that reality is made to re-en-
ter into appearance. We can find exam-
ples of this at a variety of scales, from 
Henri Matisse’s literal or non-descriptive 
use of the colour red in his Red Studio 
(1911), to the nomination of huge derelict 
red shale heaps in Scotland as ‘process 
sculptures’ by the conceptual artist John 
Latham (Niddrie Woman, 1975-6). While 
on the one hand such art merely reim-
poses semblance at a higher scale by 
introducing ‘external’ elements into new 
aesthetic and semantic relationships, 
Adorno also warned that anti-illusionis-
tic art risks becoming subject to exter-
nal determination whereby it loses its 
constitutive difference from everything 
else: “Art is indeed infinitely difficult in 
that it must transcend its concept in or-
der to fulfil it; yet in this process where 
it comes to resemble realia it assimilates 
itself to that reification against which it 
protests.”14 But what if those ‘realia’ are 
semantically alive and co-constitutive of 
the human artist who is making the work 
of art, and not external at all?
How then can we rethink this de-
fining dilemma of contemporary art in 
relation to posthumanist conceptions of 
self and thought as continuous with a 
world that is itself living thought? What 
changes for the ontology of art when, in 
Kohn’s formulation, “Selves, human or 
nonhuman, simple or complex, are out-
comes of semiosis as well as the starting 
points for new sign interpretation whose 
outcome will be a future self”?15 Another 
way to put this question is to ask how art 
can protest a reified or ‘empirical’ real-
ity that is more sentient and intelligent, 
less objectlike, stabile or docile, than the 
20th century imaginary could fathom? In 
addition, is the ineluctable semblance 
character even of radically anti-illusion-
istic process art, its ‘second naturalism’, 
fundamentally in contradiction with the 
posthumanist project if artists want to 
engage a posthuman conception of re-
ality in a way that exceeds its mere use 
as subject matter, i.e. by declaring art’s 
co-extensivity with a living, thinking 
world? If posthumanist art simply throws 
its lasso of autonomy around worldly liv-
ing semiosis and calls it art, does this not 
only perpetuate the human exceptional-
ism it intends to dismantle by reimposing 
semblance or meaning upon what is al-
ready meaningful? If, however, it rejects 
the power of its own autonomy, how is 
it possible to attain the semblance that 
is its vestigial difference from empirical 
reality, and by which it can interpret and 
resignify the thinking world? All these 
dilemmas exist arguably within an even 
broader one: posthumanism might also 
risk converting all of reality into creative 
capitalism’s ideal image whereby not 
only human but also nonhuman creative 
and semantic production is subsumed 
into processes of value creation. While 
the intention of posthumanist discourse 
is to imagine an ‘open whole’ in which the 
man-form fades out into a multitudinous 
sea of entangled living exchanges and 
relationships, this opening stands at the 
brink of capitalism’s own world-changing 
power to map, capture, informatise and 
commodify all living systems. A question 
that pertains politically as much as artis-
tically, then, is: What becomes of Gilles 
Deleuze’s formulation that “Life becomes 
resistance to power when power takes 
life as its object,”16 when the affirmation 
of life risks complicity with the affirma-
tion of contemporary capitalism?17 Does 
art’s assimilation of the semiotic powers 
of ‘realia’ follow suit by affirming that 
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which capitalism now also affirms? Or al-
ternatively, to what extent can the post-
humanist affirmation of the biosphere’s 
different layers and orders of thought and 
‘trans/individuation’18 enable us to think 
beyond our present course of a capital-
ist ecocide unfolding out of the legacy of 
enlightenment humanism?
Art and the  Expande d Human
Before the term posthumanism be-
came current, Joseph Beuys was using 
the term ‘anthropological art’ to refer to 
an expanded human creativity that in-
volved communion with other beings, 
spirits, materials and intelligences. In a 
1983 television discussion of his 1965 per-
formance Wie man dem toten Hasen die 
Bilder Erklärt (‘How to Explain Pictures 
to a Dead Hare’) on the West German 
TV programme ‘Club 2am’, Beuys made 
a crucial statement to deflect his inter-
viewer’s requests for a cogent conceptu-
al explanation of the piece. He counters 
that it is not art’s job to be understood 
through pure intellection, but rather in 
the sense of a ‘full understanding’. He ex-
pands this idea by adding: “The work gets 
into the human being, and the human be-
ing gets into the work.”19 The original per-
formance at Galerie Schmela in Dussel-
dorf involved the artist walking around a 
gallery cradling and gently animating the 
paws and ears of a hare as he murmurs 
to it, introducing the dead creature to an 
assortment of pictures which are hard to 
discern. Initially the audience is locked 
outside of the gallery, and only admit-
ted after some time, staging a series of 
proximities, intensities and assemblies. 
Beuys’s head is covered in a mixture of 
gold and honey, giving him the discon-
certing appearance of a hybrid man-ma-
chine-god, part cyborg, part totem. The 
symbolism of the gold is that of conduc-
tivity, while the honey symbolises com-
munal productivity and the hare is a sym-
bol of reincarnation. The animated dead 
hare is neither living being nor object; it 
has become instead an aesthetic being 
or, perhaps, a ‘being of sensations’.20 
The artwork compellingly introduces the 
hare’s would-be consciousness into the 
space of art, while the deadness of the 
hare is also lamented – it cannot ‘under-
stand’ because it is dead and because 
it isn’t human, and probably it was also 
killed by humans. Yet the inclusion of the 
hare, not as a mere material but a poten-
tial consciousness (even if cancelled), 
introduces something of Kohn’s ‘broader 
living semiotic realm’ to which the art-
work is, in certain respects, subordinat-
ed. What does or would the hare think, 
and more to the point, how does the hare 
think? How does thinking the hare think-
ing art change our sensibility and there-
fore change art? Beuys’s animation of 
the hare, making it reach out to touch the 
pictures with its paw, creates a beautiful 
and extraordinary sequence of gestures 
in which man and animal momentarily 
fuse. In his later television discussion, 
Beuys explains how we have entered the 
field of anthropological art, and that we 
are no longer within an art of ‘innovation’ 
but one in which ‘mankind’ stands in the 
middle of ‘the creative path’ as such. “I 
have,” says Beuys, “always seen the 
connection between humans and their 
much greater being (Wesen) as the most 
important task of art.”21 This greater be-
ing, he explains, relates to magical ap-
pearances and to realms that belong to a 
‘higher principle’ than mankind, involving 
everything above and below us. 
Yet here it is important to emphasise 
that for Beuys the human is not under-
mined or negated but given a concen-
trically expanded identity of being-in-re-
lation which does not appear to present 
any sort of existential crisis for ‘mankind’. 
Within Beuys’s proposal, the status of the 
artwork’s semblance is thinkable as a se-
mantic unity that participates in numer-
ous others generated within a monistic 
reality. The semblance of this artwork is 
to point out different semantic territories 
beneath or above the consciousness of 
prosaic human reality (which includes art 
as conventionally understood). The hu-
man self is thought of in relation to a mul-
tiplicity of other selves, yet this does not 
threaten to dissolve the human as such. 
The precarious status of the artwork’s 
elements that are drawn together in its 
unity seem to almost overstep the dilem-
ma of choosing between illusionism or 
anti-illusionism, mediation or immediacy, 
autonomy or heteronomy, because the 
living world in which the artwork tran-
spires is not of a different, merely ‘empir-
ical’ order that can be submitted to such 
treatment. Mediation and semblance, by 
implication, are not the exclusive prov-
ince of humans, and art does not exist 
in exceptional opposition to a reality 
characterised by facticity and indetermi-
nateness. Yet for all this, Beuys is still a 
superstar artist, the hare is still dead, the 
gallery continues to act as the artwork’s 
framing device, the audience behaves as 
if it is at the circus, and the entire perfor-
mance is filmed for television broadcast. 
The connection between the human and 
its ‘much greater being’ is scaffolded 
across layers and levels of mediation 
that make the artwork’s semblance char-
acter undeniable and limit the perception 
of all other semantic unities. The risk and 
potential of the artwork’s loss of distinc-
tion is offset by these conventions of 
separation and autonomy, and the work 
staunchly occupies its place in the canon 
of 20th century art instead of disappearing 
into a cacophonous cosmos.
I would like to consider this perfor-
mance by Beuys together with the work 
of Ana Mendieta, not only because both 
belong to what, after Beuys, I am calling 
the ‘anthropological stage’ of neo-avant-
garde art, but also due to their important 
differences. In her ‘earth-body works’ of 
the 1970s and ’80s, we certainly find an 
expanded idea of human/world relations 
connected to an anthropological and 
even primordial conception of art. Yet 
despite, or in spite of their human-centric 
ontological expansions, the works per-
sistently interrogate the contingent na-
ture of identity, body, culture and power. 
This should not necessarily be seen as 
contradictory, since, like the philosopher 
of technological becoming, Gilbert Si-
mondon, she is interested in the relation 
between the ‘preindividual’ that remains 
in all beings, and the always contingent 
process of individuation:
My art is grounded in the belief 
of one universal energy which runs 
through everything: from insect to 
man, from man to spectre, from spec-
tre to plant from plant to galaxy. My 
Ana Mendieta: Imagen de Yagul  
© The Estate of Ana Mendieta Collection, LLC 
Courtesy Galerie Lelong & Co. Licensed by Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York
Ana Mendieta: Alma Silueta en Fuego
© The Estate of Ana Mendieta Collection, LLC 
Courtesy Galerie Lelong & Co.  Licensed by Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York
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works are the irrigation veins of this 
universal fluid. Through them ascend 
the ancestral sap, the original be-
liefs, the primordial accumulations, 
the unconscious thoughts that ani-
mate the world.22 
In her Silueta series in particular, she 
stages her own body – as a direct pres-
ence, incised outline or heaped mound 
– within natural settings in Mexico and 
her adoptive home of Iowa, USA.23 The 
series, captured as photographs and 
short films, stages the mixing of a female 
body of colour with earthly elements and 
shifting temporalities in such a way as to 
relativise all states of embodiment, cul-
tural signification and material occupa-
tion. In Imagen de Yagul, the first in the 
series which began in 1973, she is pho-
tographed lying naked in a ruined tomb 
in Yagul, Mexico, covered with a spray 
of white flowers. The fresh-cut flowers 
obscure her face, and her half-exposed 
limbs evoke both burial and rebirth, even 
a bride’s first conjugal act. The photo-
graph of this performance in particular 
produces a polysemic eruption of the 
body as it claims its links to pre-Colom-
bian cultures as much as the exclusivity 
of contemporary art, to the living and the 
dead, to seduction and the macabre, to 
a material continuity with the earth and 
the discontinuities of modernity and its 
mediations, to the ‘cosmic sap’ of the 
ancestors that creates identity and be-
longing, and to women’s transhistorical 
sexual exploitation which dislocates us 
from every society. In contrast to Beuys, 
Mendieta’s work explores an expanded 
humanness which composites the el-
emental and ancestral together with a 
poststructuralist interrogation of identity 
and power into a complex dialogue. Em-
phatically, for Mendieta, to be gendered, 
raced and othered does not mean losing 
one’s orientation within time, culture and 
sensuous relation to the natural world. 
In a sequence of occupations and trans-
formations documented in this series, 
Mendieta inscribes her body (or its pro-
jected image) by way of fire, scoring, 
blood, paint or gunpowder, physical im-
pression or immersion in water, sand and 
soil, as a way of locating herself, or a self, 
within and against the social positionings 
of the female Latina subject. Her works 
explore the multiple incarnations of hu-
manness, giving historical specificity 
to our current capitalist and biopolitical 
conceptions of identity which flash up 
as afterimages to her silhouettes. Her 
simultaneous physical occupation of 
natural sites and critical excavation of 
contemporary discursive fields is remi-
niscent of Robert Smithson’s work from 
this time which performed parallel op-
erations upon singular landscapes and 
a virtual art discourse – a relation he 
termed ‘site/non-site’. The capacity to 
project the self onto the external world of 
nature and living semiosis, to create an 
autonomous semblance of the self, is ex-
plored as a transhistorical human activity 
which Mendieta seizes on as a means of 
orientating within the unstable cycles not 
only of birth and death, individuation and 
decomposition, but successive orders of 
culture and power. Thus her work is crit-
ically deconstructive and anthropolog-
ically expansive at once. It interrogates 
Eurocentric monohumanism and the 
autonomous self which it levels against 
all subjects deemed less-than-human 
together with the regime of art that this 
history has engendered. Yet this decon-
struction nearly always entails rooting 
a self sensuously and immanently in the 
living material world outside the histori-
cal specificity of contemporary society 
and the conventions of autonomous art.
The  Biopolitical Scission
But while these neo-avantgarde 
works by Beuys and Mendieta critique 
modernity’s severance of the human and 
its art from the living world, both remain 
inescapably within the paradigm of au-
tonomous art for which the creation of 
semblance relates as much to the art-
ist’s selfhood as it does to any dialogue 
with the living semiotic realm. The au-
thor-function of autonomous art is a limit 
these works cannot or do not overstep, 
and this is what marks their difference to 
the ancient or animistic cultures they in-
voke. The presence of the camera in both 
performances stands in for and enacts 
this function by splitting the technolog-
ical image from the presentness of the 
artist to their world. This separation ex-
tracts the image from the sensuous and 
semiotic receptivity between aesthetic 
concept and living world, removing it for 
the purposes of discursive valorisation 
in a more discursively empowered (be-
cause institutionally ordered) elsewhere 
(e.g. the gallery or catalogue). For Martin 
Heidegger, this activity is indivisible from 
the defining practices of ‘man’ in the age 
of the ‘world picture’: “What is, in its en-
tirety, is now taken in such a way that 
it first is in being and only is in being to 
the extent that it is set up by man, who 
represents and sets forth. The Being of 
whatever is, is sought and found in the 
representedness of the latter.”24 This 
insight presents a knotty paradox for 
the posthuman artwork that wishes to 
critique the human’s expropriative rela-
tionship to all other life while continuing 
not only to induce aesthetic unities as 
semblance, in Adorno’s sense, but in-
creasingly to overwhelm even this (albeit 
illusory) facticity with the universalising 
semantic manoeuvre of technical imag-
ing which accords being only on the ba-
sis of something’s ‘representedness’. 
We can relate this splitting of sen-
suous immediacy and the (technical) im-
age to the ‘scission’ of human life which 
Giorgio Agamben identifies as running 
throughout western epistemology from 
the classical Greek polis to the modern 
biopolitical state. This is the scission 
that, since at least Aristotle, has divided 
zoë (the creaturely life we share with all 
animals) from bios (the individual ‘form 
of life’ specific to individuals or groups), 
and which is carried over into the schis-
matic regimes of oikos and polis, mind 
and body, universal and particular, sub-
ject and object, as well as productive 
and reproductive labour. This scission 
underwrites all politicisations of life 
which entail the normative deployment 
of biological life as a pretext for the as-
cription of certain forms of life and life 
opportunities, be that citizen or refugee, 
master or slave, transgender person or 
heterosexual parent – and, we should 
add, human or animal. The life that is 
excluded from the polis, or the space of 
politics, as mere biological life is thus 
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inversely politicised through its separa-
tion, by which it is negatively included, 
becoming ‘bare life’.25 For Agamben, this 
schismatic ordering of life reaches its 
nadir in late capitalism with the advent of 
the Internet and its technical capacity to 
split the receptivity of corporeal thought 
from the ‘simple, massive social inscrip-
tion’ of our collective knowledge. To this 
he counterposes the authentic human 
capacity for thought: “Thought is form-
of-life,26 life unsegregatable from its form, 
and wherever there appears the intimacy 
of this inseparable life, in the materiali-
ty of corporeal processes and habitual 
modes of life not less than in theory, there 
and there alone is there thought.”27 Here 
Agamben is close to Kohn’s statement 
that “all life is semiotic, and all semiosis 
is alive” but for the fact that Agamben 
shies away from explicitly connecting his 
model of corporeal thought to the wider 
web of organisms that sustains and ex-
changes with human life. He is more in-
terested in developing a reciprocal mod-
el of affection which circulates between 
thought and the specificity of forms of 
life and produces a relation between the 
‘universality’ of human intelligence and 
the sensuous, habitual and suffering ex-
perience of each and every human life: 
Thinking does not mean simply 
being affected by this or that thing 
but this or that content of thought in 
act, but being at the same time af-
fected by one’s own receptivity, gain-
ing experience, in every thought, of a 
pure potential of thought. Thought is, 
in this sense, always use of oneself, 
always entails the affection that one 
receives insofar as one is in contact 
with a determinate body […]28
For Agamben, abstract universal 
concepts do not simply bear down upon 
the individual life like a knife, as it were, 
but undergo the self-affection of thoughts 
as they are lived, and life as it thinks; the 
living of thought transforms thought and 
life, uniting them as one. This is also 
the relation between use of the self and 
thought, which orientate and experience 
each other. The motor of recursivity he 
describes is also the crux of what he 
sees as human life’s open-ended poten-
tial; its world-making ‘species being’, to 
adopt Marx’s term. The Internet, then, 
threatens not only the ‘simple, massive 
social inscription’ of human knowledge 
that circulates in a digital stratum devoid 
of sensuous receptivity, but, still more 
worryingly, also entails the circulation of 
informatic inscriptions of planetary life-
forms split from their universal, i.e. not 
only human, potential for self-affection. 
Like zombies, these data-objects are left 
to wander the digital rhizome waiting to 
be deployed for any potential (capitalist) 
use. This digital proto-life, which is con-
verted into a ‘standing reserve’ for capi-
talist production and utility, thus compris-
es the biopolitical scission writ large. 
Locke d-in Syndrome ? 
If progressive art of the post-war 
and pre-networked ’60s and ’70s was 
interested in elaborating a (not unpara-
doxical) anthropological art that aimed at 
reconnecting the human to an expanded 
ontological field as a way out of moder-
nity’s death drive, we find in the ‘posthu-
manist’ art of today abundant signs of a 
dystopian fragmentation of the human 
whose sense of connection and agency 
is not so much liberated from oppressive 
monohumanism as confronted by the 
massive social inscription of knowledge 
in the form of ubiquitous informationali-
sation and technical images. This is dif-
ferent from what cultural theorist Claire 
Colebrook condemns as the disconnect 
between the affirmative tone of (posthu-
manist) theory that jars with our state of 
late capitalist ecocide. In her account, 
“Precisely when life, bodies, and vitality 
have reached their endpoint and face ex-
tinction, and this because they have been 
vanquished by technology and non-living 
systems (including the systemic and 
psychotic desires of man) – precisely at 
this point in history – theory has retreat-
ed into an ‘affirmation of life’.”29 Instead, 
these artworks register something like a 
waning of vitality connected to a gener-
al inability to cognitively map self/other 
relations within naturo-technological mi-
lieux. This in turn seems to produce the 
artwork’s weakened semblance, which 
may be reflective of the ‘meaningless-
ness’ and noise engendered by a ubiqui-
tous technological mimesis of the living 
world. Bound up with this is a sense of 
the human’s decreasing or imploding field 
of agency resulting from ‘its own’ tech-
nological extensions which are at odds 
with the positive valences of posthuman-
ist discourse and the ‘open whole’. If we 
compare what could be called the inter-
special work of Beuys and Mendieta in 
which the human ‘grows’, to use Beuys’s 
word, into an expanded field of meaning, 
to certain contemporary formulations of 
Intsallation view, Ophiux, Joey Holder, 2016
Courtesy of the artist
Intsallation view, Ophiux, Joey Holder, 2016
Courtesy of the artist
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posthumanism, we see the conspicuous 
presence of technology now forming 
their central subject, and with this an 
exploration of transindividuation which is 
principally linked to a capitalist, not ani-
mist, imaginary and potential. 
Joey Holder’s recent film installa-
tion Ophiux (Wysing Arts Centre, 2016) 
is paradigmatic of this sense of disorien-
tation and depotentiation brought on by 
techno-capitalist mimesis of the natural 
world. In this piece Holder develops a 
fictional near future, drawing upon con-
temporary biogenetic science, in which 
“synthetic biology has been fully real-
ized and applied to both advance human 
evolution and increase life expectancy, 
and where human biology has been com-
puter programmed.”30 The project is set 
in a scientific ‘clean room’ belonging to 
a speculative biotech company called 
Ophiux, and installed with larger than 
life-size biological imaging machines 
and a gene sequencing machine. The 
lab space is staged as ghoulishly com-
mercial through the inclusion of stacked, 
illuminated boxes containing preserved 
crustaceans posed against CGI images 
that swirl together swatches of seabed 
and ocean water. These advertorial vi-
trines are emblazoned with the super-
charged, gothic font of the Ophiux logo 
alongside an image of a reptilian eye 
overlaid with scanning technology – the 
sinister telos of the cyborg. The intention 
is to create an all too possible scenario 
in which all life, having been genetical-
ly mapped, has become the property of 
this faceless corporate entity. Holder’s 
accompanying film dissembles itself as 
Ophiux’s promotional material, which 
boasts of having mapped ‘the entire 
ecosystem’. Footage of assorted marine 
life and CGI animated biomorphs are 
spliced together with footage of real, re-
mote-controlled marine science robots 
through whose impassive windscreens 
we watch the trippy underwater world 
pass by. The film cuts back and forth to 
images of scanning machines in the lab, 
whose electronic sounds are woven into 
a minimalist and eerie soundtrack – the 
sound of technological a-subjectivities 
working on speculative lifeforms. This 
provides the musical analogue to the 
film’s CGI’d assemblages of scientific 
equipment and massively magnified mi-
cro-organisms, brought together into a 
series of non-specific and creepy virtual 
exchanges. Yet for all its cartoonery the 
film plays out with the inexpressibly sad 
footage of a robot arm clumsily grasp-
ing at tiny albino crabs on the ocean 
floor. As it hovers over the small colony 
clustering there, we feel the inexorable 
consequence of two semiotic univers-
es not communicating but colliding: the 
preyed-upon semiosis of organisms with 
their vital processes, and the relentless 
power of techno-human abstraction di-
vorced from suffering and care. Through 
this, the reflexivity of living thought is 
flattened into the stored data of a new 
economic order which, like the industrial 
age’s reliance upon oil, requires the com-
bustion of millions of dead organisms to 
unleash its force.
In Cécile B. Evan’s 2013 film Made 
with Minds this human capacity to ab-
stract from life is folded back onto the 
human being, which becomes its object 
and target. An AI’s ‘voice’ meditating on 
humanness plays over the slowly mov-
ing image of a white female head whose 
face has been eclipsed by a blank blue 
disc: “They have arms that have hands 
that work with fingers. They have made 
things with those hands or with words 
that came from thoughts which they also 
made with their minds.”31 The blue disc 
acts as a cipher for the technological 
mapping of emotion and identity, and a 
placeholder for what becomes of these 
once this mapping has been achieved. 
As with Ophiux, the soundtrack is also 
crucial to the work’s overall legibility, but 
here it reinforces rather than undercuts 
the disconcerting sense of a hostile ‘proj-
ect’ that, through ingenuity and patience, 
is quietly being built against the interests 
of human or perhaps all life. This under-
taking seems to be the ubiquitous digital 
mimesis of any and every available ‘ob-
ject’. The indifference governing mass 
technological replication also structures 
the sequence of shots and challenges 
the artwork’s claim to semblance, (which 
nevertheless reimposes itself through its 
intentional presentation of asignifying, 
computational aesthesis). In one pan, 
what appears to be a photographic im-
age of a partially draped body developed 
on a cloth surface reveals itself as the 
underside of a parasol with the reflec-
tion of water bouncing off it as though at 
a poolside. The shot continues from the 
parasol to the sky until the sequence is 
abruptly terminated through the inser-
tion of a blank magenta field, followed 
by a doubled image of the female head 
with a blue-circle face on a grey tex-
tured background. The important chink in 
this poker-faced presentation of the hu-
man’s computational (and by extension 
artistic) transcription comes, as it does 
in Holder’s film, through the comical im-
personation of the hostile agency it con-
templates. The AI’s ‘desire’ to be human 
fetishises behaviours we ourselves may 
Film still, Ophiux, Joey Holder , 2016, 21’32’’
Courtesy of the artist
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not even consider or acknowledge: “Do 
you want to act like they did; put security 
codes on everything, or on vibrate so that 
their phones don’t even ring? Wish we 
could switch up the roles and we could 
be like that. […] Would you ask them 
questions like, ‘Where are you at?’. ‘Cos 
we’d be out, four in the morning, on the 
corner rolling, doing our own thing.”
The  Conatus of Art and Life
How then do these two films relate 
to Beuys’s image of the reciprocal ex-
change between artwork and viewer 
(“The work gets into the human being 
and the human being gets into the work”) 
that offers an aesthetic model coherent 
with his notion of the human’s relational 
and cosmic ontology? In both these re-
cent projects, the artwork threatens a 
future that would undermine the recep-
tivity of beings and thought attached to 
their corporeality. The nascent artificial 
life would consequently be devoid of 
what Agamben, citing Spinoza, terms co-
natus: “The demand by means of which 
each thing demands to persevere in its 
being.”32 What is left for the artwork to 
get into, and what has the artwork be-
come? Albeit with a heavy dose of irony 
that only adds to their uncertainty, these 
works register the horror of the human’s 
simulacral inauthenticity and art’s lim-
ited capacity to form any semblance 
adequate to the replicative powers of 
capitalist technologies. This could rep-
resent a terminus of art coincident with 
the culmination of modernity’s biopoliti-
cal sequence (at the point of life’s mass 
datafication), which has apprehended 
life as an abstract value to be invested 
or disinvested according to its political 
qualifications. Biopower’s double-edged 
tendency, by which zoë or bare life is in-
vested with value and rights and, by the 
same token, subjected to a barrage of 
political decisions,33 has relied upon the 
enlightenment discovery of ‘life itself’. 
Disconcertingly perhaps, this abstrac-
tion of ‘life’ as autonomous value also 
provides the blueprint for the posthuman 
re-evaluation of all life as having value. 
It is also the necessary precondition for 
the technological abstraction of lifeforms 
from their receptive corporeality, and 
all subsequent extractions this implies 
within capitalism. This epochal project 
of life’s technological over-coding and 
subsequent deadening as informational 
commodity is expressed in a simulta-
neous waning of what Noys, following 
Foucault, describes as avant-garde vi-
talism and its aesthetic pursuit of life as 
a counter-discourse to social and aes-
thetic conventions.34 When ‘life itself’ no 
longer provides a resource of creative 
self-overcoming onto which art can fall 
back to elude a ‘fully administrated life’ 
and the problems of autonomous art’s 
separation, the exodus from aura also 
meets its limit. Art, with its ‘allergy to 
aura’ which has only deepened within 
posthuman epistemics, can neither cele-
brate its autonomy from ‘prosaic reality’ 
nor, it seems, exodus from its paradox-
ical condition of wanting to ‘bring into 
appearance what is not the result of 
making’ through recourse to an anthro-
pological extension in a semantically 
charged cosmos. This latter is because 
the possibilities of such an extension 
seem tainted by the rising techno-capi-
talist powers to extract and depotentiate 
living creativity in the same moment. 
This predicament is reminiscent of 
Adorno’s prognostication that, with the 
advancement of capitalism’s ‘organic 
composition’, “the will to live finds it-
self dependent on the denial of the will 
to live”.35 He elaborates on this idea by 
explaining that social existence com-
pels us to act as ‘means of production’ 
and not ‘living purposes’ which, in turn, 
thwarts our instinctual life drive. Similar-
ly, art, which is a ‘being of sensations’, 
an aesthetic organism (a semblance) 
that moves freely between subjective 
internalisations, is confronted by a wave 
of technocratic inscriptions of its own 
and other vitalities that render all such 
externalisations and internalisations 
potentially productive of economic, not 
only aesthetic value. The result of this 
is two-sided: on the one hand, an in-
creasing depersonalisation of affect that 
arises from its ubiquitous codification 
and normative requirement (from emojis 
to algorithmic taste mapping to service 
work); on the other, artworks whose con-
sequent deflection or ironic objectifica-
tion of expression produce a muted, and 
latently expressive, sorrow at the self-im-
posed prohibition on any art that would 
express a ‘living purpose’. 
By way of a necessarily provisional 
conclusion, we are left with several pros-
pects. One is that the technogenesis that 
feeds off the replication of vitalities could 
itself start to produce beings of sensa-
tion capable of achieving the semblance 
attained by artworks – beings, that is, 
which could attain a unity and com-
pleteness that is at once undetermined 
and ‘purposeful’. Given that the tech-
nogenesis currently unfolding is nearly 
entirely governed by capitalism’s value 
form and profit principle, this is most 
unlikely. However, a cyborgian genesis 
of art made by humans no longer cer-
tain of their species characteristics nor 
confined to a closed ontology may augur 
something more promising than these 
recent posthumanist works might imply. 
This is imaginable as the repositioning of 
art within a wider creativity understood 
neither as innovative (as Beuys interest-
ingly insists, given capitalism’s creative 
proclivities) nor anthropological but as 
connected to a living realm in which 
the attainment of semblance, ‘purposive 
purposelessness’, is not a talent monop-
oloised by human art but discovered as 
the productive activity of all life, which, 
as the reverse face of capitalist half-life, 
reveals itself in purposeless conatus or 
the purposive purposelessness of per-
severing in existence. Only within such 
an open horizon, which should never be 
confused with indifference to conditions, 
is it possible for life and art to attain their 
true purpose, which is to be governed by 
no ostensible purpose nor adapted to any 
residual use.□ 
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